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JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. 
A. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
§S.l. Procedural rule-making by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
Perhaps one of the most significant constitutional developments in 
recent history was the implementation, during the 1967 SURVEY year, 
of the supervisory power of the Supreme Judicial Court over the ad-
ministration of inferior courts for the furtherance of justice and the 
regular execution of the laws. A statute, couched in broad, general 
terms, lodges powers of superintendence in the Court.1 The scope of 
these powers was expanded by a 1956 statute, which also provided 
for administrative machinery to aid in the execution of these pow-
ers.2 To some extent, this legislation is declaratory of independently 
existing powers.3 Certainly there are areas in which the Court's super-
visory power inheres in its status as a repository of judicial power. The 
boundaries of these areas have never been defined with any degree 
of precision. Principally, the power of the Court has been exercised 
for regulation of the practice of law.4 
In the first few years after the enactment of the expansive statute 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a 
member of the Bars of Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
§8.1. 1 G.L., c. 211, §3. 
2 Id., as amended by Acts of 1956, c. 707. The amendment also added §§3A·3F 
to G.L., c. 211, creating the office of executive secretary, defining his functions and 
authorizing the establishment of judicial conferences. 
3 See Commonwealth v. Bouchard, 347 Mass. 418, 198 N.E.2d 411 (1964). noted 
in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.3. See also 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§IO.I, 10.2. 
4 See Collins v. Godfrey, 324 Mass. 574, 87 N.E.2d 838 (1949), and cases cited 
therein. 
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of 1956, the Court exercised its supervisory power mainly in the area 
of judicial "housekeeping" in the lower courts. The Court's power 
extended to the optimum utilization of judicial manpower, the main-
tenance of adequate courthouse facilities, and the collection of judi-
cial statistics.5 Another aspect of the supervisory power has extended 
to the perception of deficiencies in the statutes governing practice 
and procedure in the courts, and the recommendation of corrective 
legislation.6 
In 1960, however, a change in the emphasis of the supervisory 
power occurred. The concept of supervisory power became one which 
stressed the rule-making power of the courts themselves.7 There has 
come about a transition of the office of the Court into one of overseer 
of the administration of justic(! in a broad sense. It would be an over-
simplification to pinpoint 1960 as marking the precise date of a shift 
in the scope of supervisory power from judicial housekeeping to the 
general administration of justice. Thus, in 1958, the Court anticipated 
Gideon v. Wainwright,S which was not decided until 1963, by pro-
mulgating its Rule 10.9 This rule provided for assignment of counsel 
to represent indigent defendants charged with non-capital felonies. 
Assignment of counsel for indigent defendants had been provided for 
by statute to a limited extent. to In expanding on this statute, the 
Rule recited an inherent power of courts to assign counsel even in 
cases riot covered by the Rule. 
In 1965, the Court went far beyond its customary regulation of the 
practice of law, which traditionally had consisted of determining 
Who may and who may not practice. In promulgating Rule 14,11 it 
exercised supervision, not of the relation between attorney and court, 
but of that between attorney and client, by establishing a compre-
hensive code governing contingent fee agreements. The following year 
the Court brought its rule-making power to bear in an area tradi-
tionally regulated by legislation. Except to the extent established by 
case law with respect to bills of discovery in equity, a litigant's right 
to compulsory process for obtaining information in advance of trial 
had been only that accorded by the statutes providing for. written 
interrogatories addressed to adverse parties, and those providing, in 
narrowly defined circumstances, for the taking of the depositions of 
5 See 1957 Annual Report to Supreme Judicial Court of Executive Secretary, 
Mass. Pub. Doc. No. 166. 
6 Id. Of course, collection of judicial statistics and interest in proposed procedural 
legislation continues to be an important part of the work of the executive secre-
tary, as appears in all of the annual reports of that officer. 
71960 Annual Report to Supreme Judicial Court of Executive Secretary, Mass. 
Pub. Doc. No. 166, at 17 et seq. See also subsequent annual reports, passim. 
S 372 V.S. 335 (1963). 
9 Now Rule 3:10. In 1963 the Rule was amended so as to require assignment of 
counsel in any case where punishment might be imprisonment. 
10 G.L., c. 277, §47. This statute permitted assignment of counsel to an indigent 
defendant in a capital case. 
11 Now Rule 3:14. 
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parties and others.12 By Rule 15,13 the Court established a procedure 
under which a party to a civil case may obtain, in advance of trial, 
any information which is relevant to the case of either plaintiff or 
defendant, by taking the deposition of the opposing party or of any 
other person. Previous to this Rule, information could only be ob-
tained which would be admissible as evidence at trial. 
§8.2. Use of Massachusetts "All Writs" Act. During the 1967 
SURVEY year, the Court, by its decision in Bishop v. Commonwealth,! 
further underscored its role of overseer of the administration of jus-
tice. In Bishop, the petitioner found himself enmeshed in the crim-
inal law in such a way that the established legal processes afforded 
him no avenue of final determination of his position. He had been 
convicted of a criminal offense after a trial before a judge in the Dis-
trict Court of Brockton. Pursuant to a relevant statute,2 he appealed 
to that court for trial before a six-man jury. It developed that there 
were no jury trials in that district court. Bishop then moved to trans-
fer his appeal to the Superior Court for trial, but he was informed 
that the motion would not be heard because no provision was made 
by statute for such transfers of criminal appeals. He then moved to 
dismiss the complaints against him, but was informed that this mo-
tion would not be heard because no legislative provision had been 
made for court attendants to serve at motion hearings of the court. 
It became apparent that there was no prospect of a criminal jury 
session of the court in the immediate future. 
Bishop could not appeal, because there was no final judgment of 
conviction from which an appeal would lie. It did not appear that 
he was in custody; thus he could not obtain relief on habeas corpus. 
The writ of error was not available, since there was no record for a 
higher court to review. Yet Bishop found himself subject to criminal 
charges on which, as he asserted, he had not been accorded his con-
stitutional right of speedy trial. In these circumstances, Bishop filed 
a petition for relief in the Supreme Judicial Court. The Court ruled 
that he could be given a remedy, quoting the statutory provision 
which gives the Court authority to "issue such writs, summonses and 
other processes and such orders, directions and rules as may be nec-
essary or desirable for the furtherance of justice, the regular execu-
tion of the laws, the improvement of the administration of such 
courts, and the securing of their proper and efficient administration."3 
12 G.L., c. 231, §§61-67 (interrogatories); G.L., c. 233, §§24-63 (depositions); G.L., 
c. 231, §68 (inspection of documents); G.L., c. 153, §9 (inspection of ways, works 
and machinery in certain cases). 
13 Now Rule 3: 15. 
§8.2. 1 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 519, 225 N.E.2d 345. 
2 Acts of 1964, c. 660. 
3 G.L., c. 211, §3. On the merits, the Court held that the trial had been too long 
delayed and ordered the case dismissed. A few days before the decision was an-
nounced, the Supreme Court of the United States applied the same substantive 
principle in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967). 
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§8.3. Establishment of the Massachusetts Judicial Conference. 
On June 1, 1967, Rule 3:16 became effective and brought to a new 
high point the Supreme Judicial Court's capacity to supervise the 
administration of justice in the Commonwealth. The Rule established 
the Massachusetts Judicial Conference, consisting of the members of 
the Supreme Judicial Court, the chief justices and chief judges of the 
lower courts, the chairman of the Judicial Council, and the executive 
secretary of the Supreme Judicial Court, who is designated the prin-
ci pal administrative officer of the Conference. 
The Conference resembles, in organization and function, the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States. 1 It provides a mechanism for 
considering and channeling "recommendations on matters relating 
to the conduct of judicial business, the improvement of the judicial 
system, and the administration of justice." It is obviously designed 
to be a focal point for research into, and processing of proposals for 
improvement of the administration of justice through informed use 
of the rule-making and/or legislative powers. Specific provision is 
made for the orderly and coordinated use of all persons whose talents 
are made available to these ends. The Rule contemplates the appoint-
ment of reporters, advisers, and research assistants, and the utilization 
of the facilities of law schools, other educational institutions, bar asso-
ciations, foundations, and similar organizations. The promulgation of 
this Rule will make it feasible to face the problems of judicial ad-
ministration, not on a piecemeal, ad hoc basis, but on extended fronts 
with an informed and organized group of representatives. 
B. OBSCENITY 
§8.4. Pornography: Juveniles laws. One aspect of a matter dis-
cussed in these pages a year ago1 came before the Supreme Judicial 
Court during the present SURVEY year. In connection with a review of 
cases under obscene literature statutes, note was made of the subcate-
gory consisting of legislation dealing with the distribution of such 
literature to minors. The immediate focus of the comment was upon 
a 1966 amendment to the Massachusetts obscenity statute,2 but the 
general point made was that pornography-and-juveniles laws pose spe-
cial constitutional problems. One such problem was presented in 
Commonwealth v. Corey.s The prosecution was for sale of a certain 
book to a young girl. The sale took place before the enactment of the 
1966 amendment,4 so that it was unnecessary to go into the question 
of whether the book was obscene for children, as distinct from obscene 
§8.3. 128 U.S.C. §331 (1965). See, particularly, the amendment of July 11, 1958, 
Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356, explained in 1958 U.S. Code Congo & Ad. News 3023. 
§8.4. 11966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.2. 
2 Acts of 1966, C. 418, amending G.L., c. 272, §28. 
3351 Mass. 331, 221 N.E.2d 222 (1966). 
4 The prosecution was under G.L., c. 272, §28, as amended through Acts of 1959, 
C. 492, §1. 
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in general. In fact, the Supreme Judicial Court did not find it neces-
sary to pass upon the merits of the book under the statute. 
The defendant was a bookstore clerk who sold the book toa minor. 
There was no proof, however, that the clerk had any knowledge of 
the contents of the book. The Court passed over exceptions to the trial 
judge's exclusion of proffered expert testimony as to the "redeeming 
social value" of the book, his refusal to rule that the book was not in 
fact obscene, and his refusal to rule that the statutory standard-
"which ... manifestly tends to corrupt the morals of youth"5-is 
void for vagueness. It found persuasive and controlling the defen-
dant's contention that failure to prove scienter constituted failure 
to prove that there had been a violation of the statute. 
Although the Massachusetts obscenity statute does not expressly 
limit its condemnation to one who "knowingly" sells forbidden lit-
erature to minors, the Court felt that the law must be read as im-
pliedly containing such a qualification. To hold otherwise would 
necessitate a determination that the statute is unconstitutional, under 
the principle that punishment of innocent distribution of obscene 
literature in general is contrary to constitutional provisions in aid 
of the freedom of speech and of the press.6 
While the Court recognized that the legislature may, for policy 
reasons, impose absolute liability for even unwitting performance 
of certain antisocial acts,7 it rejected the Commonwealth's contention 
that the instant situation could be fitted into that category. Forcing 
the bookseller to sell at his peril, regardless of intent, would tend to 
make him reluctant to sell the good, as well as the bad, unless he had 
first familiarized himself with the content of the book. This "chilling" 
effect would tend to obstruct free transmission of ideas which both 
the United States and Massachusetts constitutions were designed to 
nurture, and this cannot be justified, even by the admittedly laudable 
objective of preserving immature minds from tainting influences. 
There remain many unresolved constitutional problems in this 
area. There are, of course, the issues which the Court did not reach 
in the instant case, such as whether the statutory definition of ob-
scenity in the prohibition of sale of obscene matter to children meets 
the standard of definiteness,s and whether proof of "redeeming lit-
erary or social value" will save from condemnation pornography dis-
tributed to children, as it apparently saves such matter distributed 
to adults.9 Perhaps these questions will soon be answered by the Su-
preme Court of the United States. The Court has admitted to its 
5Id. 
6 See Demetropolos v. Commonwealth, 342 Mass. 658, 175 N.E.2d 259 (1961), noted 
in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1O.1, following Smith v. California, 361 V.S. 147 (1959). 
7 Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 93 N.E. 249 (1910), and cases cited 
therein. 
S See Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 V.S. 495 (1952). 
9 See Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 
383 V.S. 413 (1966), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.2. 
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calendar for consideration in the October Term, 1967, three cases10 
which may evoke decisions on the validity of "double-standard" stat-
utes, i.e., laws which provide, in effect, that publications which would 
not be "obscene" for adults may nevertheless be "obscene" in a con-
text of distribution to minors. 
§8.5. Recent United States Supreme Court decisions. Of possible 
relevance to obscenity issues is what appears to be a trend in Supreme 
Court practice, if not in Supreme Court doctrine. After hearing full 
argument in three obscenity cases, the Court on May 8, 1967, disposed 
of all three in a per curiam opinion in Redrup v. New York,l re-
versing civil and criminal judgments of state courts against sellers of 
books and magazines. The opinion summarized the various interpreta-
tions of the First Amendment which different justices or combinations 
of justices had deemed determinative of recent obscenity cases, and 
concluded that the judgments in the instant cases must fall by any 
of these tests. 
A month later, on June 12, 1967, the Court in twelve obscenity 
cases granted certiorari and summarily reversed state and federal 
court judgments against distributors or their products,2 and in a 
thirteenth case, on appeal, it likewise reversed a judgment.s In most 
of the cases the notation of reversal simply cited the per curiam deci-
sion of May 8, 1967. One notation cited Sunshine Book Co. v. Sum-
merfield4 and one cited no authority at all.5 On October 23, 1967, the 
Court summarily reversed three more obscenity cases.6 
At this stage, one can do little more than speculate as to the mean-
10 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, No. 56, October Term, 1967; United 
Artists Corp. v. City of Dallas, No. 64, October Term, 1967, probable jurisdiction 
noted, 387 U.S. 903 (1967), reported below, 402 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); 
Ginsberg v. New York, No. 47, October Term, 1967, probable jurisdiction noted, 
388 U.S. 904 (1967). Two other cases presenting a similar issue have been docketed, 
but no action upon them has been reported as of the present writing. They are 
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, No. 42, October Term, 1967, and City of 
Dallas v. Interstate Circuit, Inc., No. 44, October Term, 1967. Both cases are on 
petition for certiorari to the Fifth Circuit, and are reported below in 366 F.2d 590 
(1966). 
§8.5. 1386 U.S. 767 (1967). 
2 Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440 (1967); Friedman v. New York, 388 U.S. 441 
(1967); Ratner v. California, 388 U.S. 442 (1967); Cobert v. New York, 388 U.S. 443 
(1967); Sheperd v. New York, 388 U.S. 444 (1967); Avansino v. New York, 388 U.S. 
446 (1967); Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); Corinth Publications, Inc. v. 
Wesberry, 388 U.S. 448 (1967); Books, Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); 
Rosenbloom v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 450 (1967); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. 
Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967); Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967). 
3 Schackman v. California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967). 
4355 U.S. 372 (1958). This was the authority cited in Rosenbloom v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 450 (1967). It is a per curiam decision summarily reversing a decision 
below, "citing only Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
5 Corinth Publications, Inc. v. Wesberry, 388 U.S. 448 (1967). 
6 Potomac News Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967); Connor v. City of Ham-
mond, 389 U.S. 48 (1967); Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 
50 (1967). 
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ing of such a pattern of summary decision. It could indicate disen-
chantment by the Court with the role of evaluator of every challenged 
publication at the cost of having to wade through mountains of lit-
erary trash every term. On the other hand, it could indicate a basic 
change of the constitutional limitations upon legislative power to deal 
with obscenity. Finally, this pattern of summary decision could indi-
cate a recognition that no definitive opinion clarifying applicable 
doctrine in this area can command the assent of even a majority of 
the Court. 
The original per curiam opinion in Redrup marked out three areas 
in which government restraints upon publication may be approved. 
The first area would involve statutes reflecting "a specific and limited 
state concern for juveniles." This language may forecast a new ap-
plication in the pornography-and-juveniles field of the "narrowly 
drawn statute" standard which has been traditionally applicable to 
regulation of publication.7 
The second area in which government restraint would be permis-
sible would involve those cases where there is an assault upon indi-
vidual privacy by publication in a manner so obtrusive as to make 
it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it. 
While it is always dangerous, and perhaps pointless to draw infer-
ences from denials of certiorari, the Court has recently declined to 
review three obscenity cases which could conceivably fall within this 
area. The first, G.I. Distributors, Inc. v. New York,S is clearly incon-
clusive. While one justice dissented from the denial of certiorari upon 
the authority of Redrup, others made a point of stating that their 
votes against review were grounded on their belief that the case was 
moot. The denial of certiorari in the second case, Fort v. City of 
Miami,9 comes closer to supporting the thesis. That case involved a 
back yard display for sale of lewd sculpture. There were three dissents 
from the denial of certiorari. It is conceivable that some of the votes 
for denial may have been based upon the failure of the petitioner to 
go to the Supreme Court of Florida, the issue having been raised that 
that court, rather than the intermediate court of appeal to which the 
petition was directed, was the highest court with jurisdiction over the 
case. The third case, Bennett v. California,lO involved a conviction, 
under a lewdness statute, of "topless go-go girl dancers." One justice 
registered a dissent, but, typically, there was no explanation from 
any of the other eight justices of the refusal to review. Thus, the 
extent to which the Court will follow the implication of this Redrup 
caveat remains rather speculative. The uncertainty on this point is 
not likely to be clarified by whatever action the Court may take on 
the other obscenity case on its docket at the current writing, Levin 
7 E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
S 389 U.S. 905 (1967). 
9389 U.S. 918 (1967). 
10389 U.S. -, 88 Sup. Ct. 463 (1967). 
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v. Maryland.ll That case involves a book of photographs of nude 
males, with pictorial emphasis upon the genital organs of the models. 
Certainly, apart from the Redrup dictum, the Court has not yet ruled 
affirmatively that forcible imposition of pornography upon a captive 
or quasi-captive audience is relevant to appraisal of the validity of 
censorship laws, either on their face or in their application. 
The third area in which government restraint on publication may 
be permissible is where the situation involves "pandering," such as 
was found controlling in Ginzburg v. United States.12 While the full 
scope of the Ginzburg doctrine has not yet been spelled out, one may 
be justified in speculating that the process of "merchandising with 
a leer" may be a factor in resolving doubts of obscenity in a close 
case. (It is hardly likely, for example, that a paperback edition of 
Charles Dickens' David Copperfield would be placed in the category 
of legal obscenity if it were published with a lurid cover.) It is con-
ceivable, however, that the method of merchandising would become 
a larger factor in appraisal of pornographic materials distributed to 
the young than it would be in appraisal of similar materials distrib-
uted to the general public. 
Speculation as to the significance of Redrup and the memorandum 
decisions of June 12, 1967, must be tempered by considering that on 
that date the Court also granted certiorari and summarily affirmed a 
state court decision finding a film to be pornographic.13 There were 
four dissents in this case, the dissenters voting for summary reversal. 
Nor were that date's other memorandum decisions, previously dis-
cussed, unanimous. In some of them Justice Harlan either dissented 
or concurred specially on the basis of the distinction he drew between 
federal and state censorship power in his separate opinion in Roth 
v. United States.14 In some, one or more of the justices voted to affirm 
summarily, and in others one or more voted to take the case and set 
it down for oral argument. 
The state of Supreme Court precedent, therefore, is hardly helpful 
to the judges in state and lower federal courts in wrestling with the 
problems presented by obscenity statutes in general and by obscenity-
for-juveniles statutes in particular. It is hoped that the Supreme 
Court will, in the near future, be able to produce some useful guide-
lines in this extremely complex area. 
C. STUDENT COMMENT: RACIAL IMBALANCE IN THE SCHOOLS 
§8.6. Introduction. The legal challenge to racially segregated 
11 No. 594, October Term, 1967, on petition for certiorari to the Maryland Court 
of Special Appeals. 
12383 U.S. 463 (1966), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.2. 
13 Landau v. Fording, 388 U.S. 456 (1967). 
14 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
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schools achieved a major victory in the decision in Brown v. Board 
of Education of Topeka.1 The United States Supreme Court there 
ruled that school segregation imposed by statute violated the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In later cases, school 
segregation, caused or fostered by state or local officials, was also de-
clared to be unconstitutiona1.2 Although racial separation actively 
promoted by government officials remains a problem, especially in 
the South,S attention has shifted to problems arising from racially 
separated schools where the separation has been passively allowed by 
government rather than actively promoted.4 
Some states, such as Massachusetts, have enacted statutes to alle-
viate racial imbalance.5 Two of these statutes have been attacked in 
the courts as violative of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.6 The result of this litigation has been a conflict 
among the courts as to the validity of this type of legislation.7 It will 
be the purpose of the remainder of this chapter to analyze the judi-
cial response to legislation seeking to end racial imbalance in the 
schools. The possibilities for judicial relief, absent or in addition to 
a racial imbalance statute, will also be examined. 
§8.7. Racial imbalance laws. Of the racial imbalance statutes, the 
Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act provides the strictest standards 
§8.6. 1 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2 E.g., Taylor v. Board of Education of the City School District of New Rochelle, 
294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961); Clemons v. Board of 
Education of Hillsboro, 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 
(1956). See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
S See United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836 (5th 
Cir. 1966), afJ'd on rehearing, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), motion for stay of exe-
cution denied sub nom. Caddo Parish School Board v. United States, 386 U.S. 
1001 (1967). 
4 See Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 
78 Harv. L. Rev. 564 (1965); Freund, Civil Rights and the Limits of the Law, 14 
Buffalo L. Rev. 199 (1964); Hyman and Newhouse, Jr., Desegregation of the Schools: 
The Present Legal Situation, 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 208 (1964); Kaplan, Segregation 
Litigation and the Schools, parts 1-2, 58 Nw. U.L. Rev. I, 157 (1963); Sedler, School 
Segregation in the North and West: Legal Aspects, 7 St. Louis U.L.J. 228 (1963). 
The terms de facto and de jure will be avoided in this article because of the 
different and often confusing meanings given these terms by the courts and law 
review writers. Instead, the terms racial segregation and racial separation (or racial 
imbalance) will be used, the former meaning the division of the races actively fos-
tered by state law or school board action, and the latter meaning the division of 
the races not actively promoted by the state or school board. 
5 G.L., c. 71, §§37C, 37D. See also Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 122, §10-2I.3 (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1967); Ind. Ann. Stat. §28-5157 (Cum. Supp. 1966). 
6 School Committee of Boston v. Board of Education, 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1027, 
227 N.E.2d 729, appeal dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question, 88 U.S. 
692 (1968); Tometz v. Board of Education, Waukegan City School District No. 
61, Doc. No. 40292 (Ill. Sup. Ct. June 22, 1967). 
7 Compare School Committee of Boston v. Board of Education, 1967 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1027,27 N.E.2d 729 (1967), with Tometz v. Board of Education, Waukegan City 
School District No. 61, Doc. No. 40292 (Ill. Sup. Ct. June 22, 1967). 
9
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and strongest enforcement powers.1 Each year the local school com-
mittee must take a racial census, and, if the State Board of Education 
decides that racial imbalance exists, the local school committee must 
file a satisfactory plan to eliminate imbalance.2 Racial imbalance is 
defined as a sharp disparity between the ratio of non-white to white 
students in the school and the ratio of non-white to white individuals 
in the society "in which non-white children study, serve and work."3 
For purposes of the statute, racial imbalance exists when more than 
fifty per cent of the students in any public school are non-white.4 If 
no plan is filed, or if the filed plan is not satisfactory, state funds can 
be withheld.1I 
The Boston School Committee, in School Committee of Boston v. 
Board of Education,6 challenged this statute on several grounds. Pri-
marily, the Committee argued: (I) that the statute was too vague to 
satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirements in that 
it did not provide standards for determining a student's race and did 
not adequately define the term racial imbalance;7 and (2) that state 
action predicated on the classification of students into groups of 
"white" and "non-white" was a forbidden classification under the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.s 
The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the statute. With respect to 
the standards for determining the student's race, the Court reaffirmed 
an earlier case,9 which held that an individual's race was suffi-
ciently obvious for a school committee to take a racial census with 
reasonable accuracy. As to the ambiguity in the definition of racial 
imbalance, the Court appeared to construe the statute to mean that 
racial imbalance exists only when the school has more than a fifty 
per cent non-white student body.10 The Court held this definition to 
be sufficiently specific. 
The most significant aspect of the Court's opinion is its treatment 
of the equal protection issue. The Court held that the statute was 
entitled to a presumption of validity; that the statute was adopted 
to achieve a legitimate state purpose; and that the racial classification 
was reasonably related to effectuating that purpose. The Court stated: 
The statute has its foundation in a legislative finding that the 
Commonwealth is faced with an emergency because of racial im-
balance in the public schools. This fact, fundamental to the issue 
§8.7. 1Compare G.L., c. 71, §37D and G.L., c. 15, §ll with Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 122. 
§10·21.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967) and Ind. Ann. Stat. §28·5157 (Cum. Supp. 1966). 
2 G.L., c. 71, §37D. 
3Id. 
4Id. 
5 G.L.~ c. 15, §1I. 
61967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1027, 227 N.E.2d 729. 
7Id. at 1030, 227 N.E. 2d at 733. 
sId. at 1031, 227 N.E. 2d at 733. 
9 School Committee of New Bedford v. Commissioner of Education, 349 Mass. 
410, 208 N.E.2d 814 (1965). 
101967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1030·1031, 227 N.E.2d at 733. 
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before us, is not open to judicial reexamination. The heart 
of the matter is whether the means are reasonably related to the 
objective and hence are free of sound constitutional criticisms . 
. . . "All rational presumptions are made in favor of the valid-
ity of every legislative enactment. Enforcement is to be refused 
only when it is in manifest excess of legislative power .... It is 
only when a legislative finding cannot be supported upon any 
rational basis of fact that reasonably can be conceived to sustain 
it that a court is empowered to strike it down .... "11 
The Court has apparently placed the burden on the plaintiff to show 
that the purpose of the statute is to discriminate unjustly or that the 
classification used is not reasonably related to accomplishing a legit-
imate purpose. 
In reaching its decision in School Committee of Boston, the Su-
preme Judicial Court utilized the tests that traditionally have been 
applied in determining the validity of statutes under the equal pro-
tection clause.12 The equal protection clause is designed to prevent 
state action which discriminates between groups of citizens where 
there is no rational basis for distinction.13 In determining the validity 
of state action under the equal protection clause, the courts have 
looked to two elements: (1) the purpose of the legislation; and (2) 
the classification used to effectuate that purpose.14 Under the tradi-
tionally employed tests, if the purpose of the legislation is found to 
be legitimately within the state's police power, and the classification 
employed is found to be reasonably related to the effectuation of that 
legitimate purpose, the legislation will be upheld.15 
The significance of the Court's holding in School Committee of 
Boston is that the Court refused to deviate from these traditional 
tests in determining the validity of a statute embodying racial clas-
sifications. In contrast to the Massachusetts decision, other courts have 
departed from the traditional tests when faced with statutes embody-
ing racial classifications and have employed one of two other tests: 
(1) the state must bear a heavy burden of justification, both as to the 
purpose and the classification, where a racial classification is present; 
and (2) racial classifications are per se violative of the equal protec-
tion clause. 
The case most illustrative of the per se approach is Tometz v. 
Board of Education, Waukegan City School District No. 61.16 In 
Tometz, the Illinois Supreme Court rendered an opinion on the con-
11 Id. at 1031-1032, 227 N.E.2d at 733-734. 
12 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 9 (1967); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. 
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-527 (1959). 
13 Tussmann and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 
341, 357-358 (1949). 
14 Id. at 377-379. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
15 Tussmann and tenBroek, note 13 supra at 377-378. 
16 Doc. No. 40292 (Ill. Sup. Ct. June 22, 1967). 
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stitutionality of its racial imbalance law, the Armstrong Act. The act 
provides in part: 
As soon as practicable, and from time to time thereafter, the 
board shall change or revise existing units or create new units 
in a manner which will take into consideration the prevention 
of segregation and the elimination of separation of children in 
public schools because of color, race, or nationality.l1 
The Armstrong Act, to a greater degree than the Massachusetts law, 
allows the school boards to exercise their discretion. In Illinois 
a school board has only to take corrective action "as soon as prac-
ticable." Furthermore, it need only "take into consideration" the 
elimination of racial separation. The Illinois court declared the 
statute unconstitutional. The court held that the equal protection 
clause unexceptionally prohibited programs administered with re-
gard to race. Therefore, the racial imbalance law violated the equal 
protection clause solely because it embodied a racial classification. 
In reaching its decision, the court relied on Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka, interpreting the case as holding that racial 
discrimination is per se unconstitutional,18 In Tometz, however, the 
court equated racial classification with racial discrimination by de-
fining discrimination as "the act of making distinctions based on 
race. . . ."19 Professors Tussman and tenBroek, in an article dis-
cussing classifications under the equal protection clause, point out 
that courts have used the term "discrimination" to mean either "dis-
tinctions" or "bias." Classifications based on bias are unconstitutional: 
It is perhaps necessary to point out that there are two senses of 
the term "discrimination" which are often confused. In one sense, 
to exercise discrimination is simply to be discerning, to be quick 
at recognizing differences, to be cognitively alert. In the second 
sense, discriminatory action is action which is biased, prejudicial, 
unfair. It should be clear that legislators must, in the first sense, 
be discriminating. They must discern and recognize relevant dis-
tinctions and differences, they must draw lines, they must, in 
short, classify-and classify reasonably. What is forbidden as dis-
criminatory is the bias and prejudice suggested by the second 
sense of that term.20 
In Brown, the Supreme Court did not condemn all distinctions based 
on race, but rather struck down the racial classifications in the segre-
gation laws because they deprived Negro children of equal educa-
17 Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 122. §10-21.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967). 
18 Tometz v. Board of Education, Waukegan City, No. 61. Doc. No. 40292 at 4 
(Ill. Sup. Ct. June 22. 1967). 
19Id. 
20 Tussmann and tenBroek, note 13 supra at 358 n.35 (1949). See Loving v. Vir-
ginia. 388 U.S. 1. 9 (1967). 
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tional opportunities.21 Thus, the state did not classify reasonably, but 
rather promulgated a law prejudicial to Negroes. 
The question remains, however, whether racial classifications should 
logically be considered per se violations of the equal protection clause. 
The Illinois court's conclusion would be logical if all racial classifica-
tions involved discriminations in the sense of bias or prejudice. Prej-
udice is defined as an unreasonable predilection against something 
or a leaning adverse to anything without just grounds.22 There is 
ample evidence, however, that racial separation in the schools is edu-
cationally harmful to both Negro and white children.23 Since a racial 
discrimination (in the form of distinction) could be based on such 
just grounds, a per se rule would not be appropriate. 
While racial classifications may not be per se violative of the equal 
protection clause, it remains to be determined whether statutes em-
bodying such classifications must bear a "heavy burden of justifica-
tion." Several United States Supreme Court decisions appear to sup-
port the view that statutes embodying racial classifications bear a 
heavy burden of justification. In Korematsu v. United States,24 the 
Supreme Court sustained the removal of Japanese Americans, living 
on the West Coast, to detention centers during World War II. In 
reaching its decision, the Court recognized that the government had 
to bear a heavy burden of justification for the measure, but felt that 
the war-time emergency justified the statute even though it contained 
a racial classification. In striking down a Virginia miscegenation stat-
ute, the Supreme Court, in Loving v. Virginia,25 noted that the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in an earlier case, had declared the 
legislative purpose of the statute to be to preserve the racial integrity 
of its citizens by preventing the corruption of blood and mongrel 
breeds; Chief Justice Warren observed that this amounted to an en-
dorsement of white supremacy.26 The Court concluded that the state 
had not satisfied the "very heavy burden of justification which the 
Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes 
drawn according to race."27 
Furthermore, the Court has indicated that not only must the state 
sustain a heavy burden in justifying the purpose of the statute, but 
21 347 U.S. at 493. 
22 Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1788 (1961). 
23 United States Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public 
Schools (1967); Report of the Advisory Committee on Racial Imbalance and Edu-
cation, Massachusetts State Board of Education, Because It Is Right - Educationally 
(1965). 
24 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 u.s. 81, 100-101 
(1943). Since it was federal action being challenged in this case, the Fourteenth 
Amendment's equal protection clause, which applies only to the states, was not 
involved. However, attacks under the Fifth Amendment's due process clause have 
been held to raise the same issues. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
25388 U.S. I (1967). 
261d. at 7. 
271d. at 9. 
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it must also meet the same requirement in showing the relationship 
of the classification used to this purpose. In McLaughlin v. Florida,28 
the Court invalidated a fornication statute imposing heavier penal-
ties, and requiring a lesser quantum of proof, for interracial fornica-
tion than for intraracial fornication. The Court stated: 
There is involved herein an exercise of the state police power 
which trenches upon constitutionally protected freedom from in-
vidious official discrimination based on race. Such a law, even 
though enacted pursuant to a valid state interest, bears a heavy 
burden of justification ... and will be upheld only if it is neces-
sary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of 
a permissible state policy.29 
It is questionable, however, whether racial imbalance laws should 
be evaluated in terms of the "heavy burden of justification" test. 
Several distinctions can be drawn between racial imbalance laws and 
the statutes discussed in Loving and McLaughlin. The Supreme Court, 
in the latter case, emphasized that the statutes in question were crim-
inal in nature. The concurring opinions in both Loving and Mc-
Laughlin argued that any law which predicated criminality on the 
race of the defendant was per se unconstitutiona1.30 The majority of 
the Court in McLaughlin did not make such a sweeping statement, 
but did stress the special caution needed in evaluating a racial clas-
sification in a criminal statute. The Court implied that it must be 
more careful in evaluating a racial classification embodied in a crim-
inal statute than one embodied in a civil statute because the criminal 
statute directly deprives the individual of his liberty solely on the 
basis of race.31 Thus, a different test of validity may be applicable 
to a civil statute, such as a racial imbalance law, which does not de-
prive an individual of his liberty. This distinction was the basis of 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's refusal in School Com-
mittee of Boston to apply the McLaughlin test.32 
The statutes involved in the Supreme Court cases discussed above 
are distinguishable from the racial imbalance laws on other grounds. 
In Loving, the Court determined that the legislature's motive and the 
statute's effect was invidious, in that the law harmed a specific group 
because of its race: 
There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent 
of invidious racial discrimination which justified this classifica-
tion. The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages 
involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifica-
28379 u.S. 184 (1964). 
29 Id. at 196. 
30 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at 13 (concurring opinion); McLaughlin v. Florida, 
379 u.s. at 198 (concurring opinion). 
31 379 u.s. at 192. 
321967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1033, 227 N.E.2d at 734 (1967). 
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tions must stand on their own justification, as measures designed 
to maintain White Supremacy. We have consistently denied the 
constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of citizens 
on account of race.33 [Emphasis added.] 
Similarly, in Korematsu, the Supreme Court emphasized that a racial 
classification limiting the civil rights of a minority would be upheld 
only if there was an overriding legitimate state purpose support-
ing it.34 
On the other hand, where the legislature's purpose in utilizing the 
racial classification is to promote, rather than infringe, a group's civil 
rights, the legislation may then be classified as "benign" and should 
not be subjected to the "heavy burden of justification" test. Rather, 
the legislature should be encouraged to pass such beneficial legisla-
tion. As the Massachusetts Court found, with regard to the Racial 
Imbalance Act, the statute was not designed to harm a racial group 
or give a benefit to one group not given to another. Rather, the stat-
ute was designed to promote equality between the races. Thus, the 
Court stated: 
It would be the height of irony if the racial imbalance act, 
enacted as it was with the laudable purpose of achieving equal 
educational opportunities, should, by prescribing school pupil 
allocations based on race, founder on unsuspected shoals in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.35 
The fact that racial imbalance laws are civil statutes, and may be 
classified as "benign," in that their purpose is to promote, rather than 
infringe, a group's civil rights, would appear to be sufficient to dis-
tinguish these laws from those upon which the Supreme Court im-
posed a heavy burden of justification. 
Since a per se rule as to racial classifications would appear not to 
be valid, and the heavy burden of justification test would appear to 
be inapplicable to racial imbalance laws, the Supreme Judicial Court 
was correct in applying the tests traditionally employed in determin-
ing the validity of state action under the equal protection clause to 
the Racial Imbalance Act. The question remains, however, whether 
the Court properly applied the test to the act. This involves deter-
mining whether the Racial Imbalance Act does serve a legitimate 
public purpose and whether the classification is reasonably related 
to this purpose. 
In considering the former, there is ample educational evidence to 
show a rational basis for the act. A recent scientific survey, commonly 
referred to as the "Coleman Report,"36 was conducted for the United 
33388 u.S. at 11-12. 
34 323 u.S. at 216. 
351967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1031, 227 N.E.2d at 733. 
36 United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Equality of 
Educational Opportunity §1 (1966). 
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States Office of Education by a committee of educational experts. The 
study was concerned with the quality of education in predominantly 
Negro schools and the relation of cultural and socio-economic factors 
to academic achievement. The Coleman Report states that the achieve-
ment of children from minority groups is lower than the achievement 
of white students and that improving the physical plant, curriculum, 
and quality of teachers would help improve the education of children 
from minority groupS.37 The Report, however, indicates that the dif-
ference in teachers, facilities, and curriculum between the schools 
that are predominantly white, and schools that are predominantly 
composed of minority groups is not very great.3S Thus, the achieve-
ment gap cannot be explained by these factors alone. The Report 
contends that the school's student composition is a primary factor 
in minority scholastic achievement: 
Thus, if a white pupil from a home that is strongly and effec-
tively supportive of education is put in a school where most 
pupils do not come from such homes, his achievement will be 
little different than if he were in a school composed of others 
like himself. But, if a minority pupil from a home without much 
educational strength is put with schoolmates with strong educa-
tional backgrounds, his achievement is likely to increase.3D 
The Coleman Report is not clear, however, as to whether it is the 
cultural, socio-economic separation or the racial separation that is 
causing the harm_ If cultural, socio-economic separation were the 
critical problem, then perhaps racial classifications would not be rea-
sonably related to securing a legitimate public purpose, and the state 
could only classify along cultural lines. If both cultural and racial 
separation are harmful, however, statutes designed to eliminate either 
separation would be founded on a valid basis. 
The ambiguities of the Coleman Report were resolved in a report 
of the United States Commission on Civil Rights40 which specifically 
addressed itself to the effect of racial separation. The Coleman Re-
port's statistics and findings, as well as the additional information 
gathered by the Commission, were analyzed.41 The Commission found 
that separation in the schools is increasing, not decreasing, and that 
a great disparity exists in educational achievement of Negroes as 
compared to whites. It attributed the major source of the disparity 
in educational achievement to the harmful effect on Negro attitudes 
caused by school separation. Specifically, the Commission found that: 
(1) Negroes in predominantly Negro schools have lower educational 
aspirations than Negro students with similar backgrounds attending 
37Id. at §1.4. 
3S Id. 
3D Id. 
40 United States Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public 
Schools (1967). 
41 Id. at viii. 
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schools with a majority of white students; (2) predominantly Negro 
schools are considered as inferior by the community and teachers, 
and this stigma affects Negro attitude and achievement; (3) Negro 
children attending desegregated schools that do not have compensa-
tory educational programs perform better than Negro children in 
racially isolated schools with these programs; (4) Negro students in 
schools with a majority of white students with poor teachers achieve 
better than Negro students in schools with a majority of Negro stu-
dents with better teachers; (5) disadvantaged Negro students in schools 
with a majority of equally disadvantaged white students achieve bet-
ter than Negro students in schools with a majority of disadvantaged 
Negro students.42 
Although they differ in some respects, these two studies do not 
necessarily conflict. Racial separation seems to coincide with poor 
ghetto schools and cultural separation. While the Coleman Report 
discusses the educational difficulties of students mainly in regard to 
cultural deprivation, the Civil Rights Commission used these statis-
tics, interrelating the cultural problems to racial separation. Thus, 
the report of the Civil Rights Commission is an application of the 
principles expounded in the Coleman Report to the specific problem 
of racial separation. These two reports are the most authoritative 
educational studies; other less extensive reports have come to basically 
the same conclusions.43 
While there is disagreement among educators concerning the ef-
fects of racial separation in the schools, there is significant support 
for the proposition that racial separation, regardless of who causes 
the separation, impedes Negro motivation and achievement and de-
prives Negroes of educational opportunities equal to those available 
to whites. Therefore, the racial imbalance laws are serving a legit-
imate public purpose in ameliorating the effects of racial separation. 
The educational reports may also support the view that the racial 
classification embodied in the Racial Imbalance Act is reasonably 
related to the legitimate state purpose of achieving equal educational 
opportunities. Under the act, a school with greater than fifty per cent 
Negro enrollment would be considered imbalanced. The report of 
the Civil Rights Commission indicates that a school with a greater 
than fifty per cent Negro enrollment is harmful to the Negro stu-
dents.44 Hence, a racial classification embodied in a statute designed 
to eliminate predominantly Negro schools is reasonably related to the 
purpose of achieving equal educational opportunity. 
However, an objection might be raised that the classification is not 
reasonably related to the purpose because it is both too broad and 
42 Id. at 2011-205. 
43 E.g., Report of the Advisory Committee on Racial Imbalance and Education, 
Massachusetts State Board of Education, Because It Is Right-Educationally 2 
(1965). 
44 United States Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public 
Schools 204 (1967). 
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too narrow. The act might be considered too broad because it clas-
sifies in terms of white and non-white, and does not limit its scope 
to those non-whites suffering educational harm. The educational find-
ings of the Civil Rights Commission were specifically phrased in terms 
of Negroes rather than non-whites.45 Yet, under the Racial Imbalance 
Act, a majority school of Chinese-Americans with superior scholastic 
achievement would be considered imbalanced. In such a situation, it 
may be said that there is no relationship between the classification 
and the purpose of achieving equal educational opportunities for 
non-whites. 
While it is true that the statute is not drawn with mathematical 
precision, it would be impracticable administratively to determine in 
each instance whether students at a particular school are being edu-
cationally harmed by racial imbalance. This can only be determined 
by costly, time-consuming composite educational surveys. The edu-
cational reports indicate that non-whites as a whole will be benefited 
by legislation reducing racial separation. Of course, a school composed 
of Chinese-American students may not be educationally detrimental 
to these students, and thus the act will not benefit them. On the 
other hand, there is no indication that the act will be harmful to 
those Chinese students by reducing the homogeneity of the school's 
enrollment. Under the traditional equal protection test, the means 
only have to be reasonably related to the purpose. Thus, the Imbal-
ance Act's classification does not have to be related to its purpose of 
achieving equal educational opportunity in every instance, but rather 
must be judged by its overall effect. Since the overall effect is to re-
duce imbalance, and the educational reports indicate that correcting 
racial imbalance is educationally beneficial, the act's means are rea-
sonably related to its purpose. 
The Racial Imbalance Act might be considered too narrow in that 
it does not resolve the educational problems of culturally deprived 
white children; the Coleman Report noted the educational harm to 
culturally deprived children regardless of race. If this objection were 
valid, the state would have to solve the educational problems of all 
groups in one enactment. The courts, however, have held that the 
legislature can proceed on a step-by-step basis to eliminate the prob-
lem and does not have to attempt to cover the field with one enact-
ment; it can decide that one problem is more serious than another 
and thus warrants prior action. Thus, in Williamson v. Lee Optical 
of Oklahoma, Inc.,46 a state statute prohibited anyone except a li-
censed optometrist or op~thalmologist from fitting lenses to a face or 
duplicating lenses except upon a written prescription. The plaintiff 
alleged that the statute violated the equal protection clause by pro-
scribing the activities of opticians and by exempting from its prohibi-
45Id. at 199·204. 
46348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
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tions sellers of ready-to-wear glasses. The United States Supreme Court 
rejected this contention: 
Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and pro-
portions, requiring different remedies. . . . Or the reform may 
take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the 
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind .... The 
legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy 
there, neglecting the others. . . . The prohibition of the Equal 
Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimina-
tion. We cannot say that that point has been reached here. For 
all this record shows, the ready-to-wear branch of this business 
may not loom large in Oklahoma or may present problems of 
regulation distinct from the other branch.47 
Applying these principles to racial imbalance laws, while the legis-
lature may be quite cognizant of the problems of culturally deprived 
whites, it reasonably may conclude that, partially because of the sever-
ity of harm and the number of educationally deprived, the Negro 
faces problems proportionally more severe that demand priority treat-
ment. Furthermore, while the harm resulting from cultural separation 
may be equal to that emanating from racial separation, the legislature 
may conclude that the means of correcting the former are more com-
plex, and thus can proceed on a step-by-step basis to eliminate educa-
tional harm, giving priority to that caused by racial separation. The 
legislature does not have to achieve cultural integration of all groups 
at the same time it achieves racial integration; it does not have to 
solve all the educational problems suggested by the educational re-
ports in one enactment. The Supreme Judicial Court was, therefore, 
correct in holding that the classifications in the Massachusetts Racial 
Imbalance Act were reasonably related to its purpose of achieving 
equal educational opportunity. 
A further constitutional question might arise, however, if a legisla-
ture which had previously passed a racial imbalance law, as did 
Massachusetts, subsequently repealed that law, or if a state court, on 
independent state grounds, declared that state's law unconstitu-
tional,48 For example, the present Massachusetts law prohibits any 
school from having more than a fifty per cent non-white enrollment. 
Thus, racial separation is reduced, and Negro children have the op-
portunity to receive a better education. If, however, the legislature 
should now repeal the statute, the schools would again become im-
balanced, and in effect, the state would be assisting the deprivation 
of equal educational opportunities for Negroes. 
47 Id. at 489. 
48 In Tometz, the Illinois Supreme Court had state grounds for declaring their 
racial imbalance law invalid. Tometz v. Board of Education, Waukegan City School 
District No. 61, Doc. No. 40292, at 6 (Ill. Sup. Ct. June 22, 1967). 
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The California Supreme Court considered an analogous situation 
in Mulkey v. Reitman.49 The California legislature had enacted stat-
utes designed to eliminate racial discrimination in housing, but these 
statutes were subsequently nullified by the electorate in a referendum 
amendment to the state constitution. The California court overturned 
the referendum because it constituted state action authorizing private 
racial discrimination in the housing market in contravention of the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State author-
ization to discriminate was no less state action than state-imposed 
discrimination: 
[T]he state, recognizing that it could not perform a direct act 
of discrimination, nevertheless has taken affirmative action of a 
legislative nature designed to make possible private discrimina-
tory practices which previously were legally restricted. We cannot 
realistically conclude that, because the final act of discrimination 
is undertaken by a private party motivated only by personal eco-
nomic or social considerations, we must close our eyes and ears 
to the events which purport to make the final act legally possi-
ble. Here the state has affirmatively acted to change its existing 
laws from a situation wherein the discrimination practiced was 
legally restricted to one wherein it is encouraged within the mean-
ing of the cited decisions.50 
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the California court was 
correct in interpreting the repeal as a tacit authorization for private 
individuals to discriminate, and hence constituted invalid state ac-
tion.51 
Assuming that there were no constitutional requirement on the 
state to correct racial separation in the schools, on the basis that the 
separation was not fostered by state action, once the state has acted 
to end the separation, the subsequent repeal or invalidation of the 
statute might be considered violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
under the rationale of the Mulkey case. Although the state may have 
had no original duty to act, once it did, the repeal or invalidation of 
the law might constitute state action which had the effect of denying 
equal educational opportunities. 
§8.8. Constitutionally required state action. While some legisla-
tures and school boards have taken voluntary action to remedy racial 
separation, many more have been indifferent to the problem.1 As a 
result, interested parents and other groups have sought relief through 
the courts to compel state action where none has been taken by the 
4964 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825 (1966), afJ'd, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
50Id. at 541-542, 413 P.2d at 834. 
51 Reitman v. Mulkey, !lS7 U.S. 369 (1967). The Supreme Court did not construe 
the California opinion. as finding state action from the repeal alone. Id. at 376. 
§8.8. 1 See, e.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 
1966), cert. denied, 88 Sup. Ct. 39 (1967). 
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legislature. Several courts have held that the state has an affirmative 
duty to alleviate racial separation.2 Others have rejected this doctrine. 
The body of law developed in these cases is relevant to the present 
situation in Massachusetts for several reasons. First, it might be argued 
that the Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act does not reduce racial 
separation enough to achieve equal educational opportunity for 
Negroes; or that it has not worked quickly enough. In the three years 
since the statute was enacted, racial imbalance has not been signifi-
cantly reduced.3 In such a situation, state remedies would not prevent 
an individual from seeking judicial relief to indicate a federal right.4 
Second, the possibility exists that the Racial Imbalance Act might be 
repealed or amended, thus leaving an area in which there would be 
no voluntary state action to alleviate racial separation in the schools. 
This section will discuss the judicial response to suits seeking to com-
pel state action. 
These attacks pose somewhat different problems from those involved 
in the constitutional challenge to the racial imbalance laws. To up-
hold a racial imbalance law, a court need only find that there is some 
rational support for the proposition that racial separation deprives 
minority groups of equal educational opportunities. The court does 
not have to determine the correctness of the legislative finding, but 
must only decide that the legislature had a reasonable basis for such 
a finding. The educational reports could serve as that basis. On the 
other hand, in deciding whether to compel state action to alleviate 
racial separation, the courts can not merely determine whether there 
is reasonable evidence that such separation causes educational harm, 
but rather must make a judicial determination that it does cause such 
harm. In addition, the court must find that state action is present; 
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action that denies 
equal protection of the laws. In suits challenging racial imbalance 
laws, state action is obviously present. 
The courts that have considered the issue of educational harm are 
uniform in holding that racial separation, irrespective of the causes 
of such separation, deprives minority groups of equal educational 
opportunity. In United States v. Jefferson County Board of Educa-
tion,5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stressed 
that "psychological harm and lack of educational opportunities may 
exist whether caused by de facto or de jure segregation. . . ."6 In 
Booker v. Board of Education of Plainfield,7 the New Jersey Supreme 
Court commented that separation without force of law is harmful: 
2 See, e.g., Booker v. Board of Education of Plainfield, 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 
(1965). 
3 Boston Globe, Jan. 16, 1968, at 4, col. 4. 
4 See McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963). 
I> 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), afJ'd on rehearing, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1966), 
motion for stay of execution denied sub nom. Caddo Parish School Board v. United 
States, 386 U.S. 1001 (1967). 
6 372 F .2d at 868. 
745 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965). 
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Although such feeling [of inferiority] and denial may appear in 
intensified form when segregation represents official policy, they 
also appear when segregation in fact, though not official policy, 
results from long standing housing and economic discrimination 
and the rigid application of neighborhood school districting.8 
The court further noted the importance of an integrated education 
for all of society. 
The children must learn to respect and live with one another in 
multi-racial and multi-cultural communities .... Recognizing 
this, leading educators stress the democratic and educational ad-
vantages of heterogeneous student populations and point to the 
disadvantages of homogeneous student populations, particularly 
when they are composed of a racial minority whose separation 
generates feelings of inferiority.9 
Likewise, in Hobson v. Hansen,lo the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia found that racially segregated schools 
psychologically disrupt the aim of a democratic education, whether 
the segregation is de jure or de facto, while a racially integrated school 
system improves the attitude and increases the scholastic achievement 
of the disadvantaged child: 
This court, though unwilling to assume that Negro school chil-
dren can readily perceive the sharp difference between de jure 
and de facto situations which lawyers note, does not doubt that 
the personal harm which segregation imparts may, in some cir-
cumstances, be somewhat less in the de facto situation. What, 
however, can we expect the Negro children to think and feel 
when almost all the adult faces they see at their predominantly 
Negro schools are black, ... when - among other comparative 
indignities - their own school is crammed with students, though 
they are aware that schools across the Park have classroom space 
to spare. These circumstances, the court is convinced, in the con-
text of the local de facto segregation conspire to inflict the entire 
emotional hurt crippling to academic motivation set out in 
Brown.11 
The court also found that racial separation deprived both Negroes 
and whites of social encounters which are indispensable to a proper 
education.12 
Although the courts have often substantiated their opinions with 
evidence that imbalanced systems tend to lead to poorer educational 
8 Id. at 168, 212 A.2d at 5. 
9Id. at 170-171, 212 A.2d at 6. 
10269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). 
11 Id. at 506. 
12 Id. at 504-505. 
22
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1967 [1967], Art. 11
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1967/iss1/11
§8.8 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 123 
facilities for Negroes, to the courts the critical factor appears to be 
the feeling of inferiority that segregation produces in the Negro. As 
early as in Brown v. Board of Education of Topekap the Supreme 
Court indicated that separation without force of law can have an ad-
verse psychological effect on the Negro student, though not perhaps as 
great as that resulting from separation by force of law. "Segregation 
of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental 
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the 
sanction of the law .... "14 
The above judicial findings are consistent with the educational re-
ports discussed previously. Generally, the facts must be redetermined 
in each case, since the courts have not been willing to take judicial 
notice of the findings of the reports. However, Blocker v. Board of 
Education of Manhasset15 may present a limited exception. There, 
most white children attended two all-white schools and all of the 
Negro children attended overwhelmingly Negro schools. In granting 
relief the United States District Court noted that the system was as 
racially segregated, in fact, as schools segregated by law. The court 
held that such racial separation did cause psychological harm to the 
Negro students. The district court made this finding despite its hold-
ing that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a causal relationship 
between its particular imbalanced schools in the district and the poor 
academic performance of the Negro students attending those schools.16 
In effect, Blocker can be interpreted as creating a presumption that 
racial separation is harmful where that separation is virtually com-
plete. 
The courts that have considered whether racial separation is harm-
ful have always answered in the affirmative. However, these courts 
have not said what degree of racial separation is harmful. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court17 and the New Jersey Supreme Court18 have 
indicated in rather general language that the school boards must act 
where there is substantial racial separation, without defining what 
exact amount will be considered substantial. A more specific ruling 
was made in Barksdale v. Springfield School Committee.19 The evi-
dence in Barksdale showed that seven of the thirty-eight elementary 
schools and one of the eight junior high schools were predominantly 
Negro and Puerto Rican, even though whites constituted eighty per 
cent of the total school enrollment. Considering the ratio of whites 
to non-whites in the total school population, the district court con-
13347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
14 Id. at 494. 
15 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). 
16Id. at 227-228. 
17 Jackson v. Pasadena City School District, 59 Cal. 2d 876, 881, 382 P.2d 878, 
882 (1963). 
18 Booker v. Board of Education of Plainfield, 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d I (1965). 
19237 F. Supp. 543 (D.Mass. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 348 F.2d 261 (lstCir. 
1965). 
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cluded that any school with appreciably more than fifty per cent non-
white enrollment would be considered imbalanced.20 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit sustained the district 
court's finding that the extent of racial imbalance in the particular 
schools deprived the Negroes of equal educational opportunities but 
reversed the decision on other grounds.21 The Barksdale formula is 
consistent with the Civil Rights Commission's finding that majority 
schools generate a feeling of inferiority in the minority. 
The controversy, however, has not centered on whether a given 
degree of racial separation denies minorities equal educational oppor-
tunities, but rather on whether this denial violates the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cases that have an-
swered in the negative have done so on the basis that the Fourteenth 
Amendment only prohibits a state from denying the equal protection 
of the law. If the school board, an arm of the state, has not actively 
fostered racial separation, the denial of equal educational opportuni-
ties has not been caused by the state and thus could not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment. For example, in Deal v. Cincinnati Board of 
Education,22 the Sixth Circuit held that since the racial separation 
was not caused by the state, but rather by private discriminatory 
action, the school board had no duty to act: 
[A] showing of harm alone is not enough to invoke the remedial 
powers of the law. If the state or any of its agencies has not 
adopted impermissible racial criteria in its treatment of individ-
uals, then there is no violation of the Constitution. If factors 
outside the school operate to deprive some children of some of the 
existing choices, the school board is certainly not responsible 
there£or.23 
In Downs v. Board of Education of Kansas City,24 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit took basically the same view: 
[T]he decisions in Brown and the many cases following it do not 
require a school board to destroy or abandon a school system 
developed on the neighborhood plan, even though it results in a 
racial imbalance in the schools, where, as here, that school system 
has been honestly and conscientiously constructed with no in-
tention or purpose to maintain or perpetuate segregation.25 
The thrust of these two decisions is that school boards do not violate 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment unless they 
purposely promote racial separation. 
These two cases are rather narrow in their conception of state 
20237 F. Supp. at 544. 
21348 F.2d 261, 264-265 (1st Cir. 1965). 
22 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966). cert. denied. 88 Sup. Ct. 39 (1967)_ 
23 369 F.2d at 59. 
24336 F.2d 988 (lOth Cir. 1964). cert. denied. 380 U.S. 914 (1965). 
211 !l36 F.2d at 998. 
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action. The concept of state action generally has been expanding. In 
United States v. Guest,26 the Supreme Court indicated that the state 
may not be. excused merely because it is only indirectly involved or 
because its action is only one of several factors in depriving Negroes 
of the exercise and enjoyment of their constitutional rights: 
[T]he involvement of the state need [not] be either exclusive or 
direct. In a variety of situations the Court has found state action 
of a nature sufficient to create rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause even though the participation of the State was peripheral, 
or its action was only one of several co-operative forces leading to 
the constitutional violation.27 
Following the rationale of Guest, the state need only be indirectly 
involved in deprivation of constitutional rights. For example, school 
authorities might utilize a neighborhood school system in a town 
whose neighborhoods are segregated as a result of private residential 
segregation. The state action in adopting a neighborhood system would 
then result in racially separated schools. While the use of the neigh-
borhood system per se is not unconstitutional, its use in conjunction 
with private discriminatory practices may violate the equal protection 
clause. 
Several courts have suggested that the public, compulsory nature of 
the school system is sufficient state action. In Barksdale v. Springfield 
School Committee,28 the district court stressed: 
Education is tax supported and compulsory, and public school 
educators, therefore, must deal with inadequacies within the edu-
cational system as they arise, and it matters not that the inade-
quacies are not of their making.29 
In Blocker v. Board of Education,SO the district court noted that 
Negroes have an affirmative right not to be separated: 
In a publicly supported, mandatory State educational system, the 
plaintiffs have the civil right not to be segregated, not to be com-
pelled to attend a school in which all of the Negro children are 
educated separate and apart from over 99% of their white con-
temporaries.31 [Emphasis added.] 
In Branche v. Board of Education,S2 the district court, while accepting 
the Board's point that the school separation was caused by housing dis-
crimination and not discriminatory action by the board, implied that 
26383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
27Id. at 755-756. 
28237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 348 F.2d 261 (1st 
Cir. 1965). 
29 Id. at 546. 
80226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). 
81 Id. at 227. 
s2204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962). 
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state action, and hence the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
was present regardless of this fact: 
Segregated education is inadequate and when that inadequacy 
is attributable to state action is a deprivation of constitutional 
right . 
. . . The educational system that is ... compulsory and publicly 
afforded must deal with the inadequacy arising from adventitious 
segregation; it cannot accept and indurate segregation on the 
ground that it is not coerced or planned but accepted.33 [Em-
phasis added.] 
The rationale of these cases may be that acceptance of racial separa-
tion implies consent, and thus inaction implicates the state in the 
deprivation of equal educational opportunities. Other cases, such as 
Barksdale and Blocker, indicate that there is state action because the 
state makes school attendance compulsory, and although the school 
board has no discriminatory motive, certain administrative decisions, 
such as school zoning, transfers, and site selection, in conjunction with 
residential separation, lead to racially separated schools. 
In the cases which hold that racial separation violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the courts have not agreed on what corrective measures 
are necessary to satisfy constitutional requirements. Since the state 
is violating the equal protection clause by tolerating racial separation, 
the logical step would be to require the school board to take im-
mediate steps to eliminate this racial separation. The courts, however, 
have not required that the school boards must make the elimination of 
racial separation their sole objective. 
In Booker v. Board of Education of Plainfield,34 the New Jersey 
Supreme Court stated that exact apportionment of whites and Negroes 
in each school according to the racial ratio in the total district en-
rollment was not required, and noted that: 
[T]he goal here is a reasonable plan achieving the greatest dis-
persal consistent with sound educational values and procedures. 
This brings into play numerous factors to be conscientiously 
weighed by the school authorities. Considerations of safety, con-
venience, time, economy, and the other acknowledged virtues 
of the neighborhood policy must be borne in mind.35 
This "rule of reason" approach suggested by the Booker opinion, in 
which the correction of racial separation is balanced against other edu-
cational factors, characterizes the judicial response to suits seeking to 
compel state action to alleviate racial separation. Other courts, how-
ever, have not agreed with Booker as to the relevant educational factors 
which must be taken into consideration. For example, in Jackson v. 
33 Id. at 153. 
3445 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965). 
35 Id. at 180, 212 A.2d at 11. 
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Pasadena City School District,36 the California Supreme Court en-
dorsed the weighing of educational factors against the reduction of 
racial separation, but did not find as many factors to be relevant as in 
Booker: 
The right to an equal opportunity for education and the harmful 
consequences of segregation require that school boards take steps, 
insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance in 
schools regardless of its cause . 
. . . School authorities, of course, are not required to attain an 
exact apportionment of Negroes among the schools, and considera-
tion must be given to the various factors in each case, including 
the practical necessities of governmental operation. For example, 
consideration should be given on the one hand, to the degree of 
racial imbalance in the particular school and the extent to which 
it affects the opportunity for education and, on the other hand, to 
such matters as the difficulty and effectiveness of revising school 
boundaries so as to eliminate segregation and the availability of 
other facilities to which students can be transferred.37 
The district court in Hobson v. Hansen 38 appeared to give greater 
emphasis to racial separation than either of the above opinions: 
[C]uring segregation is not so automatically paramount an interest 
that "little, if any, consideration need to be given to the safety 
of the children, convenience of pupils and their parents, and costs 
of the operation of the school system." ... On the contrary, these 
factors should be carefully assessed; but integration must also be 
given its due and considerable weight.39 [Emphasis added.] 
While Hobson does not define exactly what is meant by "considerable 
weight," it appears that school boards are required to give primary 
attention to eliminating racial separation. 
By failing to set precise standards, the courts have insured the school 
boards a certain measure of discretion. The willingness of the courts to 
allow the school boards a measure of discretion and flexibility is quite 
understandable, since devising educational schemes is a technical area 
in which the courts have no special expertise. This judicial willingness 
to formulate general standards and to allow the school authorities 
to determine the means by which to carry out these standards is pred-
icated, however, upon the good-faith cooperation of the school board. 
When the court does not have confidence in the good faith and co-
operation of the school board to devise an acceptable plan and to 
cooperate in working toward reduced racial separation, it will formu-
late an order with very specific requirements and maintain close super-
vision. In Hobson, the district court observed that the school adminis-
3659 Cal. 2d876. 382 P.2d 878 (1963). 
37Id. at 881-882. 382 P.2d at 882 (dicta). 
38269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). 
39Id. at 508 n.l99. 
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tration was affinnatively satisfied with the present racial separation 
and that the case just fell short of the actual intent needed for de jure 
segregation.40 Although the district court did not expressly state that 
bad faith was the reason for the specificity of its order, the decision is 
exceptional in its detailed instruction to the school board. The court 
required the school board to take such specific action as abolishing the 
optional zoning plan which tended to perpetuate the separation, trans-
porting children who volunteered from overcrowded Negro schools to 
white schools with vacancies, and seeking the cooperation of the 
suburbs in a voluntary bussing program.41 
The confidence the court has in the good-faith cooperation of the 
school board will detennine the extent of discretion the court will 
allow the board. In Springfield School Committee v. Barksdale,42 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district 
court's order requiring the committee to submit a plan designed to 
eliminate racial imbalance to the fullest extent possible. The court of 
appeals reversed because the case was moot.48 The school committee 
had resolved, before the lower court's decision was rendered, to "take 
whatever action was necessary to eliminate to the fullest extent pos-
sible, racial concentration in the schools, within the framework of 
effective educational procedures."44 The court of appeals was willing 
to give the committee full discretion to devise effective solutions be-
cause they had indicated their desire to cooperate. Since they had so 
indicated prior to the district court's decision and since they had re-
solved to take the very action which the district court eventually 
ordered, the case was considered moot.45 
Thus, in those cases where litigants have sought to compel state 
action to correct racial imbalance, the courts have not been as demand-
ing as the Racial Imbalance Act in requiring corrective action by the 
school board. The courts have not imposed an absolute duty on the 
board to eliminate racial imbalance, but have only required the school 
officials to eliminate it as much as possible, taking into account such 
relevant factors as cost, safety, and transportation difficulties. 
§8.9. Conclusion. The Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act gives 
the State Board of Education power to prevent a school committee 
from operating a school with a non-white enrollment greater than 
fifty per cent.1 The Supreme Judicial Court has upheld the constitu-
40 Id. at 5011. 
41 Id. at 407. 
421148 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965). 
48 Id. at 264-266. 
44Id. at 264·265. 
45Id. at 265. Cf. Taylor v. Board of Education of the City School District of 
the City of New Rochelle, 191 F. Supp. 181, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1961): "Litigation is an 
unsatisfactory way to resolve issues such as have been presented here. It is costly, 
time consuming-causing further delays in the implementation of constitutional 
righ~and further inflames the emotions of the partisans." 
§8.9. 1 See G.L., c. 71, §1I7D: G.L., c. 15, §1I. 
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tionality of the statute, noting that there did not have to be an over-
riding legislative justification for enacting a statute embodying a racial 
classification.2 Rather the Court held that since there was a rational 
basis for the legislative finding that racial imbalance is educationally 
harmful and since the racial classification was reasonably related to 
achieving equal educational opportunities, the statute was constitu-
tional.s 
Despite the measures provided by the statute, three years after its 
enactment many imbalanced schools still exist in the Commonwealth.4 
Perhaps it is too soon to judge the effectiveness of the act. Many school 
committees may have been awaiting the results of the court test before 
making a serious effort to implement it. Whatever the inadequacies of 
the legislative solution, legislation, such as the Racial Imbalance Act, 
is likely to be the most effective source of relief. 
It is possible that Negro parents will litigate to compel the local 
school board to correct racial imbalance. While the trend of judicial 
decisions is to require state action to correct racial imbalance, the 
courts have employed a rule of reason approach in granting relief. 
They have left much to the discretion of a cooperative school commit-
tee and have not imposed an absolute duty to eliminate racial separa-
tion. Only a good-faith, reasonable effort to alleviate racial separation 
has been required. Thus, the legislature, and not the judiciary, may 
be the proper branch to correct any deficiencies in the coverage and en-
forcement powers of the Racial Imbalance Act. 
The majority of courts considering the problems of racial separation 
appear to understand that there is a vicious cycle of racial problems, 
the core of which seems to be the racially isolated schools. These 
schools place upon the Negro a badge of inferiority which culminates 
in pervasive lack of self-confidence, serious injury to his concept of 
self-worth, and deterioration of the Negro as a person. As educational 
studies point out, integrated schools may be a way to help remove this 
badge of inferiority, to help the Negro child gain an attitude of self-
worth, self-confidence, and a sense of dignity. The judicial trend seems 
to give extensive weight to the educational and psychological harm 
engendered, and therefore to require or to sustain affirmative state 
action to reduce racial separation. 
ROBERT L. BARTON 
2 School Committee of Boston v. Board of Education, 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1027, 
1032-1033, 227 NE.2d 729, 734 (1967). 
SId. at 1031-1032, 227 N.E.2d at 733, 734 (1967). 
4 There is evidence that the Racial Imbalance Act has not been successful to 
date. See Boston Globe, Jan. 16, 1968, at 4, col. 4. 
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